Internet Service Providers’ Monitoring Obligations: Recent Developments by Duah, Ebenezer
E. Duah: Internet Service Providers’ Monitoring Obligations 207




Since 2004, legislation or courts in Europe have insistently required internet ser-
vice providers (ISPs) to play various roles in the fight against online copyright in-
fringement. Some of the obligations being placed upon the ISPs have included the  
disclosure of subscribers’ personal data, the filtering and blocking of access to in-
fringing content or committing to sustained cooperative regulatory policies such as  
a graduated response mechanism. Although such approaches may be aimed at con-
trolling illicit file-sharing, the trends being pursued by the copyright holders are  
also to be seen by ISPs as a move from their “passive-reactive roles” towards “act -
ive-preventative” roles. Particularly, the scope of ISP obligations are increasingly  
being seen as blurred and this has prompted several legal challenges in the courts  
with some of the litigations ended at the national levels and others required the in-
tervention of the European Court of Justice. This paper will examine the extent to  
which the monitoring obligations placed upon the ISPs have been interpreted and  
assess the possible implications for the fight against file-sharing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It  is  not unusual  for internet intermediaries such as internet service  pro-
viders (ISPs) to conduct monitoring or blocking of certain information in the 
course of its business.1 One of the common methods used has been Deep 
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Packet Inspection (DPI)2 which is regarded among the network communit-
ies as capable of addressing various internet governance challenges includ-
ing  malware  problems3 and  the  optimisation  and  monetisation  of  com-
merce.4 The reliance on DPI has also been based on its efficiency to manage 
and apportion bandwidth for network operators. In other cases monitoring 
obligations have been essential to enable the blocking of access to undesir-
able  content.  Although,  libellous,  defamatory  or  pornographic  content 
formed the basis of liability of online intermediaries on the internet in earli-
er years5,  copyrighted content appears to be shifting the focus.  In recent 
years ISPs are increasingly being asked by the courts and governments to 
play  more active  policing  roles  on their  networks  so  as  to  tackle  online 
copyright infringement. There are several reasons why ISPs can be attract-
ive for regulatory interventions one of which lies in their size. They are of-
ten bigger than the actual wrongdoer and are easily identified. As also sup-
ported by the preamble to the Copyright Directive,6 services such as ISPs 
are best placed to bring infringing activities to an end and in addition, it is 
relatively  cost  effective  to  pursue  ISPs  rather  than  the  millions  of  file-
sharers. To accomplish such goals, the usual enforcement ‘routes’ have been 
either  through litigations  or  legislations  such  as  the  graduated  response 
mechanisms (GRM)7, both of which may be aimed at; (1) the possibility of 
sanctions against ISPs to force them to tackle infringement carried out on 
their networks by third parties;  (2) obligations to promptly inform rights 
holders of alleged illegal activities upon request and; (3) the right to apply 
1 Catharine Lumby, et al ‘Untangling the Net: The Scope of Content Caught by Mandatory 
Internet  Filtering’.  SCRIBD  <http://www.scribd.com/doc/24138351/Untangling-the-Net-
The-Scope-of-Content-Caught-by-Mandatory-Internet-Filtering>  (Accessed:  30  October 
2011)
2 Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a technology for scanning and analyzing Internet traffic and 
making decisions about how to handle it in real-time
3 Sunil Kim & Jun-Yong Lee. ‘A system Architecture for High-Speed Deep Packet Inspection 
in Signature-Based Network Intrusion Prevention.’ Journal of Systems Architecture. vol 53,  
no 5-6, pp. 310-320.
4 Armen Aghasaryan, et al. ‘Personalized Application Enablement by Web Session Analysis 
and Multisource User Profiling.’ Bell Labs Technical Journal. vol 15 no 1, pp. 67-76.
5 Lilian Edwards, ‘Defamation and the Internet and Pornography and the Internet’ in Lilian 
Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (Eds). Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic 
Commerce. (Hart Publishing 2000)
6 Recital 59 of  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament And of the Councilof 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the informa-
tion society (InfoSoc Directive) [L 167/10]
7 A “graduated response mechanism” or a “three strikes and you are out” is a legislative ap-
proach which imposes an obligation on ISPs to notify subscribers of copyright infringe-
ments occurring with their account and the possibility of their account being suspended or  
cut off if they do not desist. 
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to a court for relief against ISPs to prevent infringement of rights. While the 
“routes” mentioned above are not exhaustive, they raise concerns and pos-
sible conflicts with legislative safeguards awarded service providers8, and 
impact on the applicable fundamental rights of internet users. The paper be-
gins by examining the intermediary immunities under the Electronic Com-
merce Directive; then moves onto assess the monitoring obligations placed 
upon them from different angles before gauging their impact on the fight  
against file-sharing.
2. INTERMEDIARY IMMUNITIES
For an ISP within Europe, immunities from liabilities can be found within 
Articles 12 to 15 of the ECD9,  which deals with exemptions for acting as 
a mere conduit10 for merely caching11 or hosting information.12 Art. 12 cov-
ers ‘mere conduits’  engaged in either the transmission of the information 
provided by the recipient of the service or access provision to a communica-
tion network, while Art. 13 also deals with the automatic, immediate and 
temporary storage of information, performed for the sole purpose of mak-
ing more efficient the information’s onward transmission. Art. 14 then deals 
with hosts of online materials. It is safe to say that, the primary and possibly 
the only target for the first two immunities described above are for access  
providers  which  will  include  Scarlet,  British  Telecom  (BT)  or  TalkTalk, 
while Art. 14 targets content hosts and Web 2.0 providers, one example be-
ing social networking sites. With the high volume of transmissions that oc-
cur across an ISP network,  the various immunities  appear reasonable  as 
without them, it could be almost impossible for ISPs to provide a smooth 
service.13 While  internet  intermediaries  might  have hoped that  these  de-
fences  are  absolutely  protected,  there  are  conditional  clauses  that  apply 
such as an ISP neither selecting nor modifying the information being trans-
8 Arts 12-15 of Directive 2000/31/EC Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in partic-
ular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive-ECD) [L 178/1]
9 E-Commerce Directive (ECD)
10 ECD, art. 12
11 ECD, art. 13
12 ECD, art. 14
13 See Pablo Baistrocchi (2003) Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive 
on Electronic Commerce, 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech Law Journal. Vol 19, pp. 
111-130 (2002-2003), [126] 
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mitted14 or to comply where the notice-and-takedown (NTD) regime15 is in-
voked.16 Aside from the NTD, the scope of ISP liabilities could further be 
unspecified as the immunities shall not affect the possibility of a court or 
administrative authority … of requiring the service provider to terminate or 
prevent an infringement.17 It seems then that the basic principles applicable 
to  internet  intermediaries  can  therefore  be  summed  up as  that;  in  most 
cases, access providers by acting as mere conduits may be exempted from 
liability provided they abide by the conditions within the provisions; that if 
they are acting as a mere conduit, they are unlikely to be liable for direct 
copyright  infringement;  that  hosting  service  providers  are  not  liable  for 
monetary relief in the absence of knowledge or control; and will also not be 
liable for monetary relief if they immediately disable access to the infringing 
content upon acquiring knowledge or awareness. Except that, a court or ad-
ministrative authority can also require the termination or prevention of an 
infringement further blurring the scope of such immunities. 
A recent test case to determine the scope of an ISP liability for copyright 
infringement conducted by its users was the Australian case of  Roadshow 
Films v iiNet,18 which concerned whether the ISP, iiNet, had authorised in-
fringements of its subscribers.  The Trial  Court ruled that iiNet cannot be 
held liable for its subscribers’ illegal movie downloading by means of the 
BitTorrent P2P system19 as it had not authorised any infringements; had no 
control  over  the infringing activities;  and had adequately complied with 
procedures  to  qualify  for  immunities.  But  the  applicants  appealed,20 
through to the High Court21 who delivered its verdict in April 2012, by up-
holding the previous rulings and hence found in favour of the defendant 
ISP.22 The Courts’ position illustrates the extent to which an ISP safe har-
14 ECD, art. 12(1)
15 A notice-and takedown regimes usually relates to the copyright owners’ informing of the 
availability of , access to a protected work on an ISP network unlawfully and requesting 
that the service provider  takes appropriate steps to remove or disable access to the content.
16 ECD, arts 13(1e) and 14(1b)
17 See ECD, arts 12(3), 13(2), 14(3)
18 [2010] FCA 24
19 BitTorrent is one of the protocols for transferring large files.
20 [2011] FCAFC 23
21 John Hannebery and Miriam Zanker ‘Roadshow Films appeals iiNet Copyright Decision to 
the  High  Court’  <http://www.davies.com.au/pub/detail/417/roadshow-films-ap-
peals-iinet-copyright-decision-to-the-high-court> (Accessed: 11 November 2011).
22 See ‘iiNet: ISP Not Liable For BitTorrent Piracy, High Court Rules’ Online at, http://torrent-
freak.com/iinet-isp-not-liable-for-bittorrent-piracy-high-court-rules-120420/  (Accessed:  01 
May 2012)
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bour based on subscribers’  infringing activities could be determined and 
particularly  the  courts  showed that  providing access  to  the internet  and 
providing the means of infringement could not be the same, if control can-
not be established.
Immunity for hosts providers have perhaps been the most controversial 
of the immunities. Rowland et al, state that, “on the primary intermediary 
spectrum it comes closest to the dividing line between the two immunities 
above due to the part it plays in the publishing process which may under-
mine its  status  as  a neutral,  and therefore innocent,  immunity-deserving 
middleman”.23 Hence in order to qualify under this provision, it must be es-
tablished that the intermediary does not authorise or control the third party. 
The ECJ in the Google Adwords case24 extended this scope by taking into ac-
count the extent of the service provider’s passive or neutral conduct in de-
termining the liability exemption under Art. 14.
3. MONITORING OBLIGATIONS
Beyond the strict liability offences, the immunities outlined above, also cap-
ture negligence based offences,25 as any NTD must be read in conjunction 
with general obligations on service providers to monitor their networks.26 
While monitoring in specific cases is allowed27 Member States are to refrain 
from imposing on ISPs a general obligation on providers to monitor the in-
formation which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to 
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. With the background 
so far, the issue to begin with, is to what extent will the right of court to is -
sue an injunction to prevent infringements  intrude on the obligations on 
Member States not to impose general monitoring obligations on an ISP?
4. LITIGATIONS
One of the cases that focused on finding an answer to this issue began in 
Belgium. It was the case of SABAM v S.A. Tiscali (Scarlet),28 brought by the 
23 Diane Rowland, et al. ‘Information Technology Law’  [4th Edn] ( Routledge 2012), 85
24 [2010] EUECJ C-238/08
25 Rowland (n23)
26 Art. 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC provides that Member States shall not impose a general  
obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Arts 12, 13 and 14, to mon-
itor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek 
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
27 Recital 47 of ECD
28 [2007] E.C.D.R. 19
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Belgian Society of Authors,  Composers and Publishers  (SABAM) who in 
2004 had applied for an interim relief against the defendant ISP Scarlet, al-
leging that Scarlet knowingly permitted the infringement of its members’ 
protected works through peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing over the ISP net-
work. In particular,  SABAM sought an order29 requiring the filtering and 
blocking of SABAM’s repertoire being downloaded or shared over the de-
fendant’s  network  without  permission.  In  an  interlocutory  judgement, 
SABAM was thought to posses the grounds for granting such an order ex-
cept that the court still needed more clarity on a technical feasibility and en-
listed the services of a technical expert.30 The technical expert report had re-
commended a filtering system called CopySense31 developed by Audible 
Magic  as  the  filtering  solution  capable  of  specifically  responding  to  the 
problem,32 although the report was also cautious about the long-term effect-
iveness due to possible circumvention.33 But the trial Court appeared satis-
fied with the report and the submissions by SABAM and ruled against ISP 
Scarlet34 rejecting the defendant’s argument that the order would impose 
a general obligation on it to monitor all traffic and result in losing the bene-
fit of the mere conduit exemption under Art12.35 In the court’s reasoning, 
the technical deployments would only be confined to the blocking or filter-
ing of certain information transmitted on Scarlet’s network only.36 At that 
stage, it was to be assumed that the filtering solution at issue does (or will) 
not  conduct  a detailed  analysis  nor over-block access  by its  implementa-
tion.37 However, while it was not technically feasible to comply with the or-
der, Scarlet appealed to the Court of Appeal to set aside the lower Court’s 
judgment and make a fresh ruling on the original claims. But before render-
ing its judgement, the Court of Appeal then forwarded two questions to the 
29 Injunction pursuant to Art. 87(1) of the Belgian Copyright Act as interpreted in the light of  
Directive 2001/29/EC and Directive 2004/48
30 Fran Mady, et al ‘Translation Series: Sabam v. S.A. Tiscali (Scarlet), District Court of Brus-
sels, 29 June 2007’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027954> (Accessed: 
11 October 2011) 
31 Audible  Magic's  CopySense  is  a  network  appliance  product,  which  examines  network 
traffic at the content layer, that is, analyzes the actual file transferred in an application-layer 
transaction
32 Ibid (n28) [15]-[16]
33 Technical expert had noted that advances in technologies could circumvent the implement-
ation.
34 Ibid (n 28), 19
35 Ibid [25]
36 Ibid [32]
37 [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch) [6]
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ECJ seeking a preliminary ruling.38 The answers to these questions came in 
November 2011, when the ECJ ruled that the contested system will have to 
filter all communication traffic in order to block infringing files which will  
constitute a general obligation to monitor. 39 Consequently, it will also place 
restrictions on the right to respect for the privacy of communications and 
the right to protection of personal data, both of which are protected under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
It does suggest that the Belgian Trial Court perhaps attempted to make 
clear the normal issues relevant to any injunction such as efficacy and feas-
ibility without adequately balancing the magnitude of harm to the copy-
right owner against the burden on the ISP, not least in respect of the general  
obligation under the Enforcement Directive.40
As with the pursuit against Scarlet, SABAM had also asked for a similar 
broad injunction against Netlog,41 at a Belgian Court which also eventually 
ended up at the ECJ for guidance. The questions to the ECJ in Netlog were 
based on whether EU law and the fundamental rights to privacy and free-
dom of expression allowed national courts to issue injunctions to impose 
such a filtering system. In its ruling,42 the ECJ seemed to have repeated its 
reasoning and arrived at the same conclusion as in Scarlet.43 While Scarlet is 
an ISP, and Netlog is a an online social networking site, the differences in 
the service provision might have had consequences with the application of 
law given that an ISP could typically be providing access and not store any 
information, and even if it temporarily did (in the cause of transmission) 
would be shielded from liability within the meaning of Art. 12 of the ECD.44 
38 The question sent to the ECJ for answers were whether European Union (EU) law and, in 
particular, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, per-
mits national judicial authority to order an Internet Service Provider to introduce, for all its  
customers, in abstracto and as a preventive measure, … a system for filtering all electronic  
communications, both incoming and outgoing, passing via its services … in order to identi-
fy on its network the sharing of electronic files containing a musical, cinematographic or au-
dio-visual work in respect of which the applicant claims to hold rights, and subsequently to 
block the transfer of such files, either at the point at which they are requested or at which  
they are sent …”.
39 [2011] EUECJ C-70/10
40 Art. 3 of Directive 2004/48/EC  states that Member States shall provide for measures, pro-
cedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
which must be fair and equitable, not necessarily complicated and costly, and not entail un-
reasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.
41 Netlog is a social networking site that operates in Belgium.
42 [2012] EUECJ C-360/10
43 Ibid (n 39)
44 See Philippe Laurent,  P.   ‘SABAM v.  Netlog (CJEU C 360/10)  … as Expected!’  [Kluwer 
Copyright  Blog,  20  February  2012]  <http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/02/20/sabam-v-
netlog-cjeu-c-36010-as-expected/> (Accessed: 23 February 2012).
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Netlog arguably stores information provided by the users on its servers45 
within the meaning of Art. 14. Nonetheless, Art. 15 of the ECD are vague on 
any distinction between ISPs and hosting services providers, hence the type 
of platform may not have influenced the ECJ decision. The main considera-
tion here is that, while the ‘Netlog’ injunction had been sought on the basis 
of  the  Infosoc  directive  and  enforcement  directive46 both  directives  also 
provide that the liability exemptions in Arts. 12 to 15 of the ECD are respec-
ted.47 Hence the ECJ found that the basis of the claim would similarly in-
volve invasive analysis of the contents of data packets48 in breach of Art. 
15(1).49 German Courts have also not relented in their pursuit  against in-
fringing websites such as Rapidshare. In a recent ruling, and also taking 
into account an earlier court ruling which placed obligation on Rapidshare 
to monitor the copyright status of all works made available on its site,50 it in-
sisted  that  the  website  must  take  proactive  steps to tackle  copyright  in-
fringement. At a time when the ECJ has also ruled that access providers and 
host providers cannot be forced by national courts into broadly filtering in-
ternet users' activity to identify copyright infringing material,  it therefore 
provides further uncertainties as to which rights may be breached by the 
website’s compliance. Nonetheless, the UK High Court decision in  Twenti-
eth Century Fox v BT51 which granted an injunction against BT seemed to 
a large extent, to be carefully weighed so as to preserve Art. 15 of the ECD 
as the Court had taken into account the need for the recommended filtering 
system not to be capable of conducting a detailed analysis and over-block 
traffic.52 In rejecting challenges advanced by the respondent that the order 
would constitute a general monitoring obligation, it had also relied on the 
guidance in L’Oréal v eBay53 to conclude that the ISPs monitoring obligations 
will be more specific rather than general in nature, although the extent of 
a possible conflict with innocent third parties were yet to be determined.
45 Laurent (n 44)
46 Basis of Netlog injunction: Art. 8(3) of Infosoc Directive and Art. 11 of Enforcement Direct-
ive.
47 See for example Enforcement Directive, art. 2(3).
48 See [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch.) [167]
49 Netlog (n42)
50 See  Out-law  News  at  http://www.out-law.com/en/Art.s/2012/march1/rapidshare-
ordered-to-pro-actively-prevent-users-linking-to-identified-pirate-content/
51 Ibid (n 48).
52 [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch.) [6]
53 C-324/09 L’Oréal [2011] E.T.M.R. 52
2012] E. Duah: Internet Service Providers’ Monitoring Obligations 215
5. LEGISLATIONS
With  concerns  growing  over  the  effectiveness  of  existing  file-sharing 
strategies,54 new legislations are being passed or existing laws amended so 
as to place more obligations on ISPs to contain the problem. Recently the 
Spanish Sinde Act55 has been passed and a proposed amendment to the Ir-
ish Copyright and Related Rights Act, 200056 also advanced to provide own-
ers with the explicit right to obtain an injunction against ISPs.
But the most popular and equally controversial scheme has been what is 
commonly referred to as the “graduated response model” (GRM) or “three 
strikes” approach57 now being proposed, and/or implemented in several jur-
isdictions. Whether by administrative and ministerial order;58 by judicial de-
termination supported by administrative bodies or by legislatively suppor-
ted industry code59, the general commitment within a GRM begins with the 
gathering of evidence through the harvesting of alleged infringers’ internet 
protocol (IP) addresses, the notification of alleged infringement by their re-
spective ISPs and internet traffic management to include internet suspen-
sion or disconnection for repeat infringers
The French HADOPI law60 passed in 2009 to implement a GRM involves 
detection by the copyright owners of potential infringements to be reported 
to the HADOPI administrative authority. The HADOPI authority then con-
sults  with other  parties  involved,  and if  contented,  contacts the relevant 
ISPs to seek the identification of these alleged infringers,61 while also requir-
ing  the  ISP  to  send  the  first  notification  to  the  matched  subscriber. 62 
54 IFPI Digital music Report (2010)
55 See  ‘Spanish  Sinde  law  Brings  About  the  First  Website  Take  Down  Requests’  at 
<http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number10.7/sinde-law-takedown-requests>.
56 See information on draft proposal at <http://www.djei.ie/press/2012/20120126a.htm>.
57 A “graduated response mechanism” or  a “three  strikes  and you are out” are measures 
which generally require an ISP to take some action against subscribers suspected of copy-
right infringement:   ranging from notification of  alleged infringement with the account, 
keeping records of allegations made against subscribers and alerting copyright owners, to 
account suspension and termination of service.
58 Heesob  Blog,  ‘Facts  and  Figures  on  Copyright  Three-Strike  Rule  in  Korea’.  Online  at  
<http://hurips.blogspot.com/2010/10/facts-and-figures-on-copyright-three.html> 
(Accessed:22/01/2012)
59 Example being the Digital Economy Act 2010, s. 3-18.
60 Passed in 2009 to provide a graduated response as a means to encourage compliance with  
copyright laws and HADOPI is the acronym of the government agency created to adminis-
ter it.
61 May, B. and Liens, M. (2009) France’s Attempt to Introduce Anti-Piracy Legislation.
62 Lovejoy ‘Procedural Concerns with the HADOPI “Graduated Response Model. ‘Online at, 
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/procedural-concerns-with-the-HADOPI-
graduated-response-model> (Accessed: 15 January 2011).
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A second notice is sent, if the IP address of the subscriber first notified is 
suspected of being engaged in another infringement over the subsequent six 
months.63 If  within  one year  after  the  second notice,  a  user’s  IP address 
again appears among those reported to the HADOPI authority, the user will 
then be subjected to judicial procedures to determine guilt where penalties 
ranging from fines through to the disconnection of an internet could be ex-
pected along with the option of subscribers appeal.64 On the face of it, al-
though the account holder is to comply with his obligation to monitor his 
own account,65 ISP will be tasked with monitoring at various stages in the 
process, not least when technical measures are introduced to manage serial 
infringers’ accounts. Arguably, based on the guidance in L’Oréal, such mon-
itoring may qualify as a specific rather than a general obligation. With slight 
variations in the French model, the UK GRM legislation under its Digital 
Economy Act DEA, 201066 is of particular interest as the Courts have had to 
decide on whether the contested provisions placed any monitoring obliga-
tions  on  the  ISP  while  the  draft  obligations  code  is  being  finalised.  As 
a background, the UK model entails an initial obligation, technical obliga-
tion and a website blocking provision. The initial obligations require ISPs to 
act upon the infringement report received from copyright holders by warn-
ing respective subscribers of alleged infringement occurring with their ac-
counts.67 While it also places upon them the obligations to design and main-
tain a copyright  infringement list  (CIL) of  serial  infringers  to  be handed 
over to the rights holders upon request so as to pursue a legal action.68 The 
technical obligation when introduced may lead to internet account manage-
ment in varying degrees including internet speed slowdown and the sus-
pension of a subscribers’ account.69 Concerns raised by the ISPs led to a ju-
dicial review of the DEA in the case BT v The Secretary of State70 and among 
the grounds of challenges advanced was the potential breach of immunities 
under the ECD. Claimants had submitted that the obligations will require 
63 Ibid
64 See Grégory Sroussi ‘France - The HADOPI Law and France’s Controversial Fight against  
Piracy.  <http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/20091016/
Pages/FranceTheHADOPILaw.aspx .> (Accessed: 14 February 2011).
65 Decrees No. 2010-695 dated 25 June 2010 (OJ 26 June 2010, at 11536).
66 The Digital Economy Act 2010 (c. 24) is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom  
regulating digital media.
67 Communications Act (CA) 2003 s 124A
68 Ibid
69 Ibid [124G (3)] 
70 [2011] EWHC 1021
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them to monitor the information transmitted by subscribers, and also retain 
that information and monitor all other CIRs notified in respect of the same 
subscriber.  Whereas technical  measures may also “give rise to a de facto 
form of  real  time  monitoring,  based  on internet  usage over  a  period  of 
time”.71 The judicial review judgement found nothing in the initial obliga-
tions code as constituting a general obligation on the claimants  (ISPs) to 
monitor any information, nor a general obligation to actively seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity.72 In the High Court’s reasoning, the 
data to be handled by the ISPs73 would be nothing more than merely report-
ing to the subscriber, information received from the right holders of alleged 
infringement which is legally permissible. While the maintenance of the in-
fringement list by ISPs, within the meaning of 124B CA, 2003, would also 
amount to a mere compilation of CIRs in  respect  of  a  repeat  infringer74, 
rather than an obligation to monitor that information. In the Court's inter-
pretation, right holders have rather been the parties who actively seek facts  
and circumstances indicating illegal activity through the harvesting of IP 
addresses of alleged infringers,75 hence engaged in monitoring. In March, 
2012, the UK Court of Appeal76 also found the DEA not in breach of EU 
laws, after indicating that the balance struck by the DEA was about right,77 
although it is the case that the High Court interpretation of Art. 15 meant 
that the Court of Appeal did not give permission on that point.78 So far, the 
Courts have found no need to address any potential conflict posed by tech-
nical measures as the introduction of any technical measures will only be 
considered if the implementation of an initial obligations code has failed to 
reduce  online  copyright  infringement  by  about  70  percent.79 A  clause 
equally controversial had been s. 17 of the DEA which allows for the mak-
ing of provision about injunctions preventing access to locations on the in-
ternet. In summary, it had been feared that, it would provide broad injunc-
71 The DEA Challenge, ‘A copy of the Statement of Facts and Grounds filed at Court by BT 
and  TalkTalk’.  <  http://www.btplc.com/newsadmin/attachments/statement%20of%20facts
%20and%20grounds.pdf>  (Accessed: 12 May, 2011), pp. 44




76 [2012] EWCA Civ 232
77 Ibid [46]
78 [2011] EWCA Civ 1229 [20]
79 See Harding, T. (2010) The Digital Economy Act, 2010: Content and Implications. Journal of 
E-Commerce Law and Policy, 12 (5), 3-5.
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tions and would be open to abuse or misuse. While the controversy appears 
to have faded as the UK Government has indicated that it is unlikely to use 
this  provision  in  the  foreseeable  future,80 existing  provisions  under  UK 
copyright law has resulted in ISPs being ordered by the Courts81 to imple-
ment  technical  measures  to  monitor  and block their  users’  access  to  in-
fringing websites.82 These developments still raises concerns about the over-
all impact on other stakeholders, not least the impact upon innocent third 
parties.
6. VOLUNTARY SCHEMES
Also being developed are voluntary (or potential) schemes which are mod-
elled through contractual agreements between the ISPs and subscribers, or 
other proposed instruments capable of by-passing judicial oversight. They 
are often proposed and implemented where governments are unwilling to 
legislate or where there may not be the legal basis upon which a national 
court could grant a relief.83 The EMI v Eircom,84 is an example of a voluntary 
GRM scheme based on end-user  contractual agreements which the court 
ruled as lawful so as to protect copyright online, but practically potential 
conflicts  with aspects of  users rights have always raised concerns.  There 
have also  been quite  lot  of  debates  about  the  Anti-Counterfeiting  Trade 
Agreement  (ACTA)85 and  online  copyright  infringement.  Although,  it  is 
only a proposed legal instrument, the potential impact can be envisaged. 
Particularly Art 27 of ACTA imposes an obligation on States to support "co-
operative efforts with the business community" in order to enforce criminal 
and civil law in the online environment.86 This means that the scale and ex-
tent of such measures can be decided upon by private companies without 
the need for any judicial scrutiny. While, the lawfulness of such orders in 
the  European sense  have  (and could  see)  the  intervention  of  its  highest 
80 Out-Law  News  ‘New  Website  Blocking  Regulations  not  on  The  Agenda,  Government 
says’.< http://www.out-law.com/page-12129>  (17 February 2012).
81 Implemented in the UK by s. 97(A) of the CDPA 1998
82 See Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 
1152 (Ch.)
83 See EMI v UPC [2010] E.C.D.R. 17
84 [2010] IEHC 108
85 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a multinational treaty for the purpose 
of establishing international standards for intellectual property rights enforcement.
86 See ‘ACTA Fact Sheet’ Online at,  http://www.edri.org/ACTAfactsheet.
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Court so as to protect the rights of the end-user, voluntary agreements can 
therefore be illegally implemented outside the law.
7. IMPACT ON THE FIGHT AGAINST FILE-SHARING
Now how will the discussions impact on the fight to control file-sharing? 
What has emerged is that a broad injunction against a service provider to 
deploy filtering systems may constitute a general monitoring obligation, in 
breach of the ECD. It also established that by the active monitoring of all the 
data relating to each of its customers, it would not respect the rights of in-
ternet users. In any case, it must also be pointed out that it will also depend 
on the court’s determination of the order and the exact capabilities of the re-
commended  technology.  Judging  by  the  arguments  raised  be  the  GRM 
model, there appears to be the indication that at least the initial obligations 
are less likely to entail general obligation on ISPs to monitor and hence may 
see ISPs sending warning letters to their subscribers and also keeping re-
cords  of  infringements.  In  terms  of  the  likely  implications  on  the  fight 
against file-sharing, it  could be said that the ECJ guidance87 limit  service 
providers’ responsibility to filter and block in the sense that it essentially  
clarifies the generalised efforts to require the filtering of all communications 
on networks to identify copyright infringing material and prevent transmis-
sions is not legally permissible. This invariably also sets boundaries around 
the future implementation of technical measures to be required of the ISPs. 
While, the obligations could still be contested further, what has not gained 
much attention in the debate is about finding a middle ground to engage 
with all  the stake holders where copyright  could be protected while  the 
rights  are  also  respected.  Perhaps  the  concept  of  notice-to-notice  (NTN) 
could be one way of easing the uncertainties still  associated with a GRM 
model. In a NTN system, a notification is also made by the copyright holder 
to the relevant ISP about an infringement by an account holder. The ISP will  
only forward the notification to the subscriber but takes no further action. 
Neither will  it  remove the content from the system, disclose subscriber’s 
personal data or terminate subscriber’s internet accounts. It falls to the sub-
scriber to act voluntarily which some evidence suggests will see compliance 
by consumers where the content is infringing.88 This is believed that unlike 
87 Ibid (n 39), ibid (n 42).
88 See;  ‘Canada’s  Notice-and-notice’.  <http://www.p2pnet.net/story/11344>   (Accessed  30 
April, 2012).
220 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:2
NTD  which  could  lead  to  potentially  non-infringing  content  also  taken 
down,89 the NTN approach protects user privacy.
8. CONCLUSION
In reviewing the litigations, and legislative approaches, a number of obser-
vations have been made. While the strategies identified in the paper seek 
compliance from ISPs to tackle online  copyright infringement,  ,  ISPs'  de-
fences requiring it to notify subscribers'  of alleged infringements  appear 
weak, except that there is the indication that Art.15 of the ECD also gradu-
ally being preserved by some court decisions. This is to say that, the courts 
have been very particular  not to breach this provision by taking into ac-
count the capabilities of any recommended technical measures in relation to 
users’ rights. Where these have been considered, the follow-on effects have 
also been the tacit perception of both the InfoSoc Directive and ECD at least 
complementing  each  other  instead  of  the  former  superseding  the  latter. 
Given that the ECJ judgements discussed ruled on the permissible scope of 
the injunction, they set important limits on what technical measures may or 
may not be implemented irrespective of whether they are set through litiga-
tion or legislation as examined in the light of this paper. What is still unclear 
is the potential impact that voluntary agreements may have on both ISPs 
obligations and users’ fundamental rights where orders could be implemen-
ted outside of the law.
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